Good products don’t commercialize themselves. I learned that again in 2012 when the founder of a lighting company asked me to help grow his business.
I had known him since 2007. We stayed in touch and regularly talked about the lighting market, product design, and manufacturing efficiencies. By the time he asked for help, we already trusted each other.
His company had a solid business. They designed lighting products for the U.S. market, provided OEM and ODM manufacturing, and supported customers domestically. The U.S. team was small, roughly five to eight people, and heavily focused on engineering and operations.
The company had grown mostly through word of mouth, but revenue had plateaued below $10 million. The bottleneck was not engineering or manufacturing. It was sales and marketing.
Start With the Product, Not the Sales Funnel
I did not start by calling everyone I knew. I started with the product.
I studied the fixtures and their performance. The platform had strong optics, good energy efficiency, long life backed by a warranty, and pricing that worked for OEM volume. I believed the product could compete.
The timing mattered. LED lighting was still early in its adoption curve. The U.S. Department of Energy reported that overall LED market penetration was less than 1% in 2012, reached 3% in 2014, and climbed to 12.6% by 2016. LED installations increased from 215 million units in 2014 to 874 million in 2016.
Commercial lighting still had a long way to go to convert. U.S. Energy Information Administration data shows that LEDs illuminated only about 3% of commercial lit floorspace in 2012. Lighting also represented 17% of electricity consumed in U.S. commercial buildings.
OEMs could see where the market was moving. In my experience, they moved quickly when a product gave them a reason to move. Waiting could give a competitor time to establish the product, customer relationships, and market mindshare first.
The Opportunity Was Already Engineered
The manufacturer had already made one of the smartest decisions in the process. They had done the hard engineering work before we found these customers.
The base product was engineered, certified, and in production. The optics performed well. The fixture was efficient, reliable, and backed by a warranty. We did not need to start over for an OEM customer.
That matters in OEM and ODM manufacturing. An OEM may like the performance of a standard product but still want something its competitors cannot buy off the shelf.
We made relatively simple cosmetic changes so each OEM had a fixture with its own look while keeping the underlying platform intact. The customer got differentiation without forcing a clean-sheet redesign.
This is where product development and commercialization need to work together. A strong platform should give the manufacturer room to create customer-specific products without repeatedly rebuilding the engineering underneath them.
Relationships Created Access. The Product Earned the Business.
Once I understood the product, I identified two companies in my network where I believed the platform solved a real need.
The first opportunity moved quickly. Within about 45 days, I had secured a customer meeting and requirements. The manufacturer received a purchase order less than 60 days after that first meeting.
I would not use that timeline as an OEM sales-cycle benchmark today. Several things were already aligned. The product platform was proven. Certifications were in place. Performance and pricing worked. The required changes were limited. I also had an established relationship with the customer.
Relationships created access. They did not create the product performance, economics, or execution required to keep the business.
That distinction matters. My relationship with the founder had developed for about five years before he asked me for help. My relationships with the prospective OEM customers also existed before I approached them. Trust opened the door. The product still had to earn the purchase order.
Winning Business and Absorbing Business Are Different Skills
The first program became significant business for the manufacturer. We intentionally did not force the second major opportunity into the organization at the same time.
We staggered the second program by roughly 18 months. That was a commercial decision and an operational decision.
A company with fewer than 10 domestic employees can add revenue faster than it can add execution capacity. Forecasting, purchasing, production, inventory, working capital, quality, engineering, and customer support all move with the sale.
Selling faster than the organization can execute is not good growth.
We gave the first program time to work operationally before adding another large OEM customer. The second opportunity then developed into another meaningful program.
Company leadership reported that the two programs ultimately represented substantial multimillion-dollar annual business during 2012–2014. I am intentionally keeping the company, customers, and specific financial results confidential.
The number is not the main lesson. The sequencing is.
Customer Concentration Cuts Both Ways
The founder continued to run a lean company and kept a relatively small group of important OEM customers. He was good at feeding those relationships with new products and enhancements over time.
That model works. A manufacturer learns the customer’s business. Engineering stays focused. Selling costs remain controlled. A small team can support meaningful revenue without building unnecessary overhead.
It also creates customer concentration risk.
When economic conditions weakened, the limited customer base became a challenge. More diversification could have reduced that exposure. Adding customers also adds engineering demands, inventory, forecasting, service requirements, and working capital.
The answer is not simply to add as many customers as possible. The objective is to build enough diversification to protect the business without adding more complexity than the organization can manage.
In this case, disciplined operating costs and strong margins gave the company room to work through the leaner years. Management kept the sales funnel manageable, continued supporting its customer partners, and protected the operating model.
The company has since moved beyond those leaner years and, based on my continued relationship with its leadership, has returned to growth in 2026.
The Market Changed. The Commercialization Lesson Did Not.
LED lighting is no longer the differentiator it was in 2012. DOE estimated that LED products reached 30% of U.S. general illumination lighting by 2018, with roughly 2.3 billion installations. The market moved quickly.
The competitive questions changed with it. Optics, controls, application performance, quality, cost, supply chain, customization, and speed to market now drive the discussion.
The commercialization problem is still familiar.
A good product does not create its own market. Engineering does not replace sales. Sales does not replace engineering. Relationships do not replace product-market fit. Growth does not work if operations cannot support it.
Looking back, I do not think the biggest accomplishment was finding two large OEM customers. The manufacturer had already built the foundation.
My role was to understand what was commercially valuable about that foundation, identify customers where it solved a real need, and help connect the two without pushing the organization faster than it could execute.
Sometimes the next growth opportunity is not another product that needs to be invented. It is understanding who needs the product you already built, what limited changes make it valuable to them, and whether your organization is ready to deliver when the opportunity arrives.